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Abstract
In this paper, we construct the country-speciﬁc chronologies of the
house price bubbles for 12 OECD countries over the period 1969:Q1-
2010:Q2. These chronologies are obtained using a combination of a
fundamental and a ﬁlter approaches. The resulting speculative bubble
chronology is the one that provides the highest concordance between
these two techniques. In addition, we suggest an early warning system
based on three alternative approaches: signalling approach, logit and
probit models. It is shown that the latter two models allow much more
accurate predictions of the house price bubbles than the signalling ap-
proach. The prediction accuracy of the logit and probit models is
high enough to make them useful in forecasting the future specula-
tive bubbles in housing market. Thus, our method can be used by
the policymakers in their attempts to timely detect the house price
bubbles and attenuate their devastating eﬀects on the domestic and
world economy.
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IIIThe past decade has proved
again that the phrase “safe as
houses” is a nonsense. Property
will always be volatile — and
ﬁnancial crises will always be
destructive. The main aim for
policymakers must be to sever





The striking role played by housing markets in the recent ﬁnancial crisis has
demonstrated that shocks in the housing sector can exert huge eﬀects on real
economic activity, in particular through their impact on private consumption
and residential investment (Goodhart and Hofmann (2008)). Housing loans
constitute the largest liability of households and account for a large propor-
tion of bank lending. Especially in the Anglosaxon countries, in Spain, and
some of the new EU member states, house prices increased tremendously in
the pre-crisis period. The bursting of these house price bubbles has triggered
massive production losses and raised serious doubts about the sustainabil-
ity of the growth model in these states. In other countries like Germany,
house prices did not accelerate at all. To the extent that the development of
house prices is not equal across countries, they may constitute a source for
business cycle divergence and can limit the prospects of a common monetary
policy in the euro area. Housing markets are therefore highly relevant for
the appropriate policy design.
Real house price dynamics depend on institutional features and macroe-
conomic and demographic conditions, most notably disposable income, the
housing stock, inﬂation, interest rates, bank credit, changes in equity prices,
population growth, see Muellbauer and Murphy (2008) and Kholodilin et al.
(2010) for recent analyses. Lower interest rates decrease the opportunity cost
of capital invested in housing, reduce the servicing cost of mortgage credit
and raise the present value of future household earnings. The feedback from
1property prices to credit growth is stronger in countries with more dereg-
ulated mortgage markets, see Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004). For example,
borrowing costs exert a negative eﬀect on real house changes in US regions,
see Holly et al. (2010). Although house prices are usually driven by national
forces, international components might be relevant in some cases. For in-
stance, the evolution of real house prices in London is linked to New York
and other ﬁnancial centers (Holly et al. (2010)).
In addition, strong monetary growth over the recent years may have
supported the emergence of house price bubbles, although the evidence is
less clearcut on this point, even if international spillovers are acknowledged
(Dreger and Wolters (2009)). A rise in liquidity aﬀects the quantity and
marginal utility of money holdings relative to housing and other assets. To
restore equilibrium a rebalancing of the liquidity-asset ratio compatible with
optimal portfolio allocation is required (Congdon (2005)). The adjustment
process triggers higher housing demand and subsequent price increases. Ac-
cording to Adrian and Shin (2008), this eﬀect is ampliﬁed through the pro-
cyclical balance-sheet management of ﬁnancial intermediaries. The leverage,
i.e., the ratio of total assets to equity is raised during house price booms and
reduced in downturns. In addition, the relatively low and stable inﬂation
environment reduced risk premia and might have led to higher ﬁnancial in-
stability, that is, excess credit pressures and additional leverage (Borio and
Lowe (2002)).
Real house prices aﬀect private consumption through a housing wealth
and a collateral channel, see Case et al. (2005) and Dreger and Reimers
(2009). An increase in housing wealth will raise consumption, due to its im-
pact on expected lifetime income. Consumption expenditures can be shifted
upwards without violating budget constraints. However, the eﬀects on hous-
ing wealth are not obvious. A permanent increase in house prices could
have a positive eﬀect for homeowners, but there is also a negative eﬀect on
tenants who have to pay higher rents, and on prospective ﬁrst-time buyers
who have to save more for their intended house purchase, see Poterba (2000)
and Goodhart and Hofmann (2008). In addition, increases in the value of
owner-occupied housing do not foster the ability of a household to consume
more of other goods and services unless that household is willing to realize
the increased value, for example, by moving into a less expensive ﬂat. Many
households are not expected to do that, including those who intend to leave
their homes as bequests. A positive impact of house prices on housing wealth
implies that the winners win more than the losers lose. This is more likely
2to occur if would-be homeowners interpret a house price acceleration as evi-
dence that they may earn future capital gains if they step into the real estate
market. Such attitudes may be encouraged by lending institutions in highly
competitive and deregulated mortgage markets.
Besides their eﬀect on housing wealth, there is also a collateral eﬀect
of house prices, as houses are widely used as a security for loans, see Aoki
et al. (2004) and Muellbauer (2008). Collateral eﬀects dramatically improve
the response of aggregate demand to house price shocks (Iacoviello (2005)).
Households tend to borrow or lend to smooth consumption over time. If
liquidity constraints exist, access to credit will be restricted. In periods of
rising house prices, however, the value of the collateral the household can
oﬀer to banks is higher. Banks become less reluctant to increase their loans.
Because of deregulation in mortgage markets, it has become easier and less
expensive for consumers to borrow against housing collateral to ﬁnance extra
consumption (Iacoviello and Neri (2010)). The ampliﬁcation mechanism due
to the increase in borrowing capacity is captured by the ﬁnancial accelerator,
see Bernanke et al. (1999) for the concept. This collateral-based accelerator
tends to be higher in more deregulated ﬁnancial markets, as ﬁnancial inno-
vation has increased the availability of funds for credit-constrained agents
(Goodhart and Hofmann (2008)). Asymmetries are likely, as the eﬀects of
shocks to money and credit on house prices seem to be stronger when house
prices are booming then otherwise.
Furthermore, housing markets have an impact on the transmission of
monetary policy (IMF (2008)). In countries with more ﬂexible mortgage
rates and higher loan-to-value ratios, i.e., the ratios between the mortgage
amount and the value of the property, the response of private consumption
and residential investment to monetary policy shocks is ampliﬁed (Calza et al.
(2009)). However, the relationship is not unidirectional, as housing wealth
also aﬀects money demand, see Dreger and Wolters (2009) and Setzer et al.
(2010), among others. There is also evidence that idiosyncratic house price
developments have been a major source of divergence in competitiveness and
the formation of external imbalances between the euro area member states,
because accelerating house prices give rise to a boom in private consumption
and import demand (Aizenman and Jinjarak (2009)). House price dynamics
inﬂuence the performance of the ﬁnancial system through their impact on
the proﬁtability and soundness of ﬁnancial institutions. Understanding this
behaviour is of utmost signiﬁcance for policymakers.
The institutional conditions in housing and mortgage markets are sub-
3stantially diﬀerent across euro area member states (ECB (2009)). In the de-
velopment of real house prices and their spillovers to the real economy, these
structural features play a crucial role. For example, Almeida et al. (2006)
have reported evidence that the sensitivity of house prices and mortgage
borrowings to income shocks is higher in countries with higher loan-to-value
ratios. Ludwig and Sløk (2004) and Carroll et al. (2006) have emphasized
that the long-run responsiveness of consumption to permanent changes in
housing wealth is higher for countries with a market-based than for countries
with a bank-based ﬁnancial system. According to Catte et al. (2004), strong
impacts of real house prices on consumption can be detected especially in
countries that have large, eﬃcient and responsive mortgage markets. See
also Calza et al. (2009). A high degree of mortgage market completeness,
i.e., the extent to which the market is able to oﬀer a variety of products and
to serve a broad range of potential borrowers is also important. The most
crucial element in this regard is the extent to which the markets provide
opportunities for housing equity withdrawal, that is, the magnitude to which
the household sector can extract liquidity from the housing market. The
response of real house prices to macroeconomic conditions as well as their
impact on private consumption and residential investment tends to be larger
if a favorable tax treatment of mortgage interest encourages the leveraging
of housing equity. Moreover, tax reliefs and subsidies, especially in favor of
home ownership, can aﬀect the development in the housing sector, and in-
come tax systems appear to be conducive to house price volatility (van den
Noord (2005)).
The importance of housing markets for the real economic performance
as well as devastating eﬀects of the housing busts require reliable tools for
timely prediction the housing price bubbles. The aim of this paper is to
design an early warning system in order to predict the bursts of the house
price bubbles. Our data set covers 12 OECD countries (Australia, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
UK, and the USA) and the time period 1st quarter 1969 – 4th quarter 2009.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the method of
deriving of a bubble chronology. Section 3, introduces three approaches —
signalling approach, logit and probit models — which are used for the predic-
tion of the house price bubbles. Section 4 compares the predictive accuracy
of these three alternative approaches. Finally, section 5 concludes.
42 Bubble chronology
Obtaining a bubble chronology is not a trivial task. Because the bubble is
not directly observable, it is not easy to distinguish between the growth of
the house prices supported by the fundamental factors and that caused by
the speculative expectations. We need to separate somehow the two eﬀects
in order to extract the speculative component.
In order to do this we propose here the following algorithm. We apply
two alternative techniques: one based on estimating the deviations from the
fundamental values and another one based on the deviations from the trend
regardless of the fundamentals. The use of both techniques can be justiﬁed as
follows. The speculative bubbles are the periods, when the house prices are
higher than their fundamental values, that is, the house prices supported by
the fundamentals. However, not each positive deviation from fundamental
values can be treated as a speculative bubble, for these deviation might be
too short and rather minor. Therefore, this chronology must be compared
with that showing the periods, when the prices are above the trend. The ﬁnal
chronology is the one conﬁrmed by both these techniques. Let us consider
our algorithm in more details.
First, the real house prices are regressed on a set of the fundamental
factors. As fundamental factors the following variables were used: 1) real
GDP per capita approximating the disposable income; 2) population size; 3)
urbanization, or share of the urban population in the total population; and
4) the own lag of the dependent variable, given the strong time persistance
of the house prices (for description of the variables and data sources see
Table 1). All these variables should positively aﬀect the house prices. The
higher income and population imply that more people need and can aﬀord
for the new or existing housing units. The urbanization is expected to have a
negative eﬀect on the house prices, since when urbanization is low, it might
imply that the more people would migrate from the rural to the urban areas
creating an upward pressure on the price of housing. The regression was
estimated in levels for each country separately1:
rhpiit = α0 + α1rhpii,t−1 + α2rgdp pcit + α3popit + α4urbanizit + εit (1)
where rhpiit is the logarithm of the real house price in country i in period t;
rgdp pcit is the real per-capita GDP; popit is the population; and urbanizit
1In order to save space we do not report here the estimation results. However, they are
avaiable upon request.
5is the urbanization rate. All other variables, except for urbanization, are
also expressed in logs. The data are quarterly and cover at most the period
1970q1-2009q4. The fundamental real house price is deﬁned then as:
rhpiit = c α0 + c α1rhpii,t−1 + c α2rgdp pcit + c α3popit + c α4urbanizit (2)
The positive deviations of the actual values from the fundamental values
are treated as the potential speculative bubbles. In addition, since these
deviations are sometimes too volatile, they are smoothed using a spline a
regression.
Second, following Mendoza and Terrones (2008) we identiﬁed the house
price booms (which are not necessarily bubbles) using the Hodrick-Prescott
ﬁlter applied to the log of the real house prices and diﬀerent thresholds
determining the intensity of the house price growth:
cycleit = rhpiit − trendit > φσ
c
i (3)
where trendit is the Hodrick-Prescott trend obtained from the actual real
house prices; φ is the boom threshold factor, determining the growth inten-
sity, and σc
i is the standard deviation of the cyclical component in country i,
cycleit. Notice that the standard deviations are country speciﬁc. When the
cyclical component is higher than the predeﬁned threshold, then it is treated
as a boom. Various values of the boom threshold factor were tested and the
optimal threshold was chosen as the one providing the higher concordance
between the deviations from fundamental values and booms.
Finally, the fundamental and boom approach are taken together to pro-
duce the speculative bubble chronology. The speculative bubble is thought
to occur only when two conditions are met: 1) the smoothed deviation from
the fundamental values is positive and higher than 0.5 standard deviation
of the deviations and 2) it coincides or partly overlaps with a house price
boom. The resulting chronology is shown in Figure 1, which plots the log of
the real house prices against the periods that we identiﬁed as the speculative
bubbles. In addition, the precise dates of speculative bubbles are presented
in Table 3.
The average durations of the speculative bubbles are reported in Table 4.
The longest speculative house price bubbles are observed in Japan, UK, and
USA: 18, 14.3, and 14 quarters, respectively. The bubbles are the shortest
in the Netherlands and Sweden: 5 and 5.5 quarters, correspondingly.
63 Prediction of bubbles
3.1 Signalling approach
The ﬁrst method used here in order to detect and predict the speculative
bubbles is the signalling approach. This method implies that for each relevant
indicator of the bubble there exists a certain critical value, trespassing of
which may be considered as an signal of an approaching or ongoing bubble.
We consider the following variables as the relevant ones, that is, as the
variables, which might be useful for predicting the speculative bubbles: nom-
inal and real money market rate, money supply, nominal and real money
supply growth, spread, real eﬀective exchange rate, rent, house price - to -
income ratio, house price - to - rent ratio, investment rate, nominal and real
private lending ratio, general government balance - to - GDP ratio as well as
growth rate of real per-capita GDP.
The algorithm is as follows. First, each of the above variables is smoothed
using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter separately for each country. Second, the
smoothed series are standardized by dividing them by the country-speciﬁc
standard deviations. Third, the smoothed and standardized variables are
stacked over each other to build a panel. Fourth, a grid of potential critical
values, or thresholds, is set comprising the values between 0.2 and 3 with a
step equal to 0.2. Thus, 15 possible thresholds are examined. The variable
is said to send a signal of bubble when it exceeds a threshold. For each
threshold, the accuracy of detecting the bubbles is evaluated by adding up the
share of correctly identiﬁed bubbles in the total duration of bubbles and the
share of correctly identiﬁed episodes of no bubbles in the total duration of no-
bubble periods. It is clear that both measures move in the opposite directions.
The higher the threshold the less bubble periods are identiﬁed, however,
the less false alarms (signals of bubbles when no bubbles take place) are
produced. Therefore, the maximum of this measure corresponds to striking
a balance between correctly identifying the bubbles and sending less false










where τ is the threshold (τ = 0.2,0.4,...,3); i is the variable index; A, B,
C, and D are deﬁned in the following table:
7Bubble No bubble
Signal A B
No signal C D
This measure is similar to the signal-to-noise ratio. We decided to add
and not to divide the left and right terms, given that at high τ values no
false alarms are produced and hence D = 0.
From 15 diﬀerent threshold values, τ, the optimal value is selected such
that Zτ
i is maximized over τ. These optimal values together with the accuracy
coeﬃcient, Zτ
i , are reported in Table 2.
For this optimal threshold an individual signal series is produced for each
variable. This signal series is equal to 1, when the smoothed and standardized
variable exceeds the threshold, and to 0, otherwise.
From the individual signal series a composite signal series is computed
as a weighted average. The weights are the squared accuracy coeﬃcients,
(Zτ
i )2. They are squared in order to give even more weight to the variables
that are more useful in predicting the speculative bubbles. The composite
signal series is depicted in Figure 2 as the continuous black line. The gray
shaded areas represent the periods of speculative bubbles.
3.2 Logit/probit approach
Logit/probit approach is an alternative technique of detecting and predicting
the speculative bubbles. It allows determining the sign and signiﬁcance of
the inﬂuence of each of the relevant variables in predicting the speculative
bubbles. In general, these two — logit and probit — techniques can be
formulated as:
Pr(Rit = 1|Xit) = F(Xitβ + εit) (5)
where Pr(•) is the conditional probability of the speculative bubble; is the
reference chronology of the speculative bubbles; Xit is the set of relevant
variables listed in the section on the signalling approach plus the property
tax rate; F(•) is some cumulative probability function (logistic or Gaussian
one); εit is the disturbance term. The diﬀerence between the logit and probit
models lies in the corresponding probability functions.
Here we apply the logit and probit approaches to the panel data. The
ﬁxed eﬀects were accounted for by subtracting from all the variables, except
for the dummy ones, their within-group means. Then, the pooled logit and
probit estimation was applied to these demeaned data.
8Figures 3 and 4 compare the model-derived probabilities of speculative
bubbles based on the logit and probit models (continuous black line) to the
binary reference chronology (gray shaded areas). Both models produce sim-
ilar results and allow capturing the bubbles quite accurately.
4 Evaluating the accuracy of predicting the
bubbles
The accuracy of the alternative prediction approaches presented above can
be evaluated using the Quadratic Probability Score (QPS) measure, which












it is the j-th alternative model-derived probabilities of speculative
bubbles (based on signalling approach as well as on logit and probit models).
QPS varies between 0 and 1. The lower the QPS the more precise are the
predictions of the speculative bubbles.
The QPS computed for all three models is reported in Table 5. It can be
seen that the signalling approach is much less accurate than the logit and
probit ones. The latter two produce practically identical results in terms of
the predictive power of the speculative bubbles. The forecasting accuracy of
the logit and probit models is relatively high. This implies that they can be
used as an early warning system in order to predict the future speculative
bubbles in the housing markets.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we constructed the country-speciﬁc chronologies of the house
price bubbles for 12 OECD countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and the USA)
over the period 1969q1-2009q4. These chronologies were obtained using a
combination of a fundamental and ﬁlter approaches. The resulting specu-
lative bubble chronology is the one that provides the highest concordance
between these two techniques.
9In addition, we suggested an early warning system based on three alterna-
tive approaches: signalling approach, logit and probit models. The predictive
accuracy of these three approaches was tested against the speculative bubble
chronologies we determined in the ﬁrst step. It was shown that the latter
two models allow much more accurate predictions of the house price bub-
bles than the signalling approach. The prediction accuracy of the logit and
probit models is high enough to make them useful in forecasting the future
speculative bubbles in housing market.
Thus, our method can be considered as an important tool to be used by
the policymakers in their attempts to timely detect the house price bubbles
and attenuate their devastating eﬀects on the domestic and world economy.
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12Appendix
Table 1: Data description
Variable Deﬁnition Source
House price index NiGEM
Money supply Datastream
Nominal and real GDP Datastream
Nominal and real investment Datastream
GDP deﬂator Datastream
Long-term interest rate 3-month interest rate Datastream
Short-term interest rate 10-year interest rate Datastream
Lending to households Datastream
Nominal exchange rate Datastream
Real eﬀective exchange rate Datastream
Population Global Insight
Urban population Global Insight
Rent index Global Insight
Real house price index House price index / GDP deﬂator own calculation
House price-income index House price / GDP OECD
House price-rent index House price / Rent OECD
Invesment rate Nominal investment / Nominal GDP own calculation
Real per-capita GDP GDP / Population own calculation
Urbanization Urban population / Population own calculation
Lending rate Lending / BIP own calculation
Spread Long-term – Short-term interest rate own calculation
General government balance-to-GDP ratio General government balance / GDP OECD
Property taxation Property tax revenues / GDP OECD
Mortgage market deregulation Dummy: 1 after deregulation, 0 otherwise Agnello and Schuknecht (2009)
13Table 2: Optimal thresholds for signalling approach
Variable Optimal Accuracy
threshold coeﬃcient
Money market rate 0.4 1.25
Real eﬀective exchange rate 1.0 1.38
Rent 0.4 1.17
House-price-to-income ratio 1.0 1.44
House-price-to-rent ratio 1.0 1.48
Investment-to-GDP ratio 1.0 1.47
Lending-to-GDP ratio 1.0 1.23
Spread 3.0 1.01
Money supply 0.2 1.12
General government balancetoGDP ratio 1.4 1.02
Real money market rate 0.4 1.24
Money supply growth 0.8 1.48
Real money supply growth 1.2 1.4
Nominal lending growth 0.6 1.39
Real lending growth 1.0 1.39
Growth rate of real per-capita GDP 0.2 1.34
14Table 3: Chronology of the speculative bubbles of house prices
Beginning End Beginning End
of bubble of bubble of bubble of bubble
Australia Netherlands
1988q1 1989q2 — 1978q2
2002q3 2004q1 Portugal
2006q4 — 1998q4 2001q1
Canada Spain
1972q3 1974q3 1973q1 1974q2
1980q2 1981q2 1976q3 1978q2
1986q1 1989q4 1986q2 1991q2
2006q1 2007q1 2003q1 2007q1
France Sweden
1979q4 1980q4 1993q4 1994q2
2002q4 2006q2 2005q3 2007q2
Germany Switzerland
1992q4 1994q3 — 1973q2
Italy 1987q1 1989q3
— 1981q4 UK
1988q3 1992q1 1971q4 1973q3
Japan 1985q4 1989q1




15Table 4: Descriptive statistics of the house price speculative bubbles
Country Number of Average Estimation
bubbles duration of sample
bubble,
quarters
Australia 3 8.7 1986q3-2009q4
Canada 4 8.8 1970q2-2009q4
France 2 10.0 1970q2-2009q4
Germany 1 8.0 1991q2-2009q4
Italy 2 9.0 1981q2-2009q4
Japan 1 18.0 1969q4-2009q4
Netherlands 1 5.0 1977q2-2009q4
Portugal 1 10.0 1995q2-2009q4
Spain 4 13.0 1971q2-2009q4
Sweden 2 5.5 1993q2-2009q4
Switzerland 2 12.0 1970q2-2002q3
UK 3 14.3 1971q1-2009q4
USA 2 14.0 1975q2-2009q4
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